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"[O]ne of the clearest lessons which can be read in the
book of history is that biological and cultural crossfertilization have preceded or accompanied epochs ofrare
vitality. " 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

"[G]lobalization, [the] denationalization of markets, laws and politics
in the sense of interlacing peoples and individuals for the sake of the
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common good"2 (and expanding communications technology), has
brought the world of transnational law3 to the door of the country
lawyer.4 As a result, the U.S. American5 practitioner, now more than
ever before, operates in a world society and economy constituted not
only of an international society and economy but also of interdependent
nations' societies and economies.6 The globalization process has given
rise to the development of transnational law practice.7

2. Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems:
The Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 401, 405-406 (1995),
citing Jost Delbruck, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for
Domestic Law-A European Perspective, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STIJD. 9, 11 (1993).
3. See Roger J. Goebel, Professional Qualification and Educational Requirements
for Law Practice in -a Foreign Country: Bridging the Cultural Gap, 63 TuL. L. REV.
443 (1989). Professor Goebel notes that there are "at least seven different types of
major transnational legal practice: contractual and transactional; foreign investment and
local law counseling; international banking and finance; international antitrust;
international arbitration and litigation; international tax planning; and trade law." Id. at
444.
4. Michael P. Waxman, The Comparative Legal Process Throughout the Law
School Curriculum: A Modest Proposal for Culture and Competence in a Pluralistic
Society, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 391, 391 (1991). Professor Waxman has addressed the
importance of communications technology in the practice of comparative law. This
article will not expand on the nexus between globalization and communications
technology as they affect the practice of law. It will discuss, instead, the importance of
teaching the law of foreign countries in their domestic language, focusing at a minimum,
on the foreign law of the United States' major trading partners, and specifically, on
Mexican law, culture, and Spanish legal language. Spanish legal language refers only
to the legal language used in Mexico.
5. The term "American" is considered by other inhabitants of the Northern and
Southern American hemispheres as being inaccurate and exclusionary. Therefore, this
article uses the term "U.S. American" because it is politically and descriptively accurate.
6. Harold J. Berman, World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1617 (1995). Professor
Berman calls our attention to the ''interlacing of peoples" that has occurred since World
War II.
[F]or the first time in the history of the human race, most of the peoples of
the world have been brought into more or less continual relations with each
other. We speak without hesitation of a world economy, a world technology,
world-wide communications, world organizations, world science, world
literature, world scholarship, world travel, world sports.
Id.
7. See David M. Trubek et al., Symposium, Global Restructuring and the Law:
Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational
Arenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407 (1994); see also Richard L. Abel, Transnational
Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737 (1994). For a discussion of strong
resistance to opening the international marketplace to trade in legal services by allowing
lawyers to practice outside their home jurisdiction on a regular basis in a foreign
jurisdiction, see Michael J. Chapman & Paul J. Tauber, Note, Liberalizing International
· Trade in Legal Services: A Proposal for an Annex on Legal Services under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 941 (1995). It should be noted
that despite this resistance, talks continue regarding opening the international
marketplace to legal services. More importantly, for the purposes of this article, there
are many ways in which foreign law is being practiced domestically without ever having
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Transnational law, first recognized as a separate area of law in the
1950s, is comprised of:
[T]he law applicable to the complex interrelated world community which may
be described as beginning with the individual and reaching up to the so called
'family of nations' or 'society of states' .... [It] include[s] all law which
regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and
private international law are included, as are other rules [such as local law]
which do not wholly fit into such standard categories. 8

Historically, U.S. American law schools (law schools) have not trained
law students for practice in the area of transnational law. The typical
law school9 curriculum has required general common law courses and
has offered electives in the areas of jurisprudence (e.g., legal realism and
social policy), specialization (e.g., bankruptcy law), and some professional skills (e.g., negotiations). More often than not, study in the area of
transnational law has been limited to survey courses in international and
comparative law. 10 Although comparative and international law courses
have endeavored to teach students theory as well as ·practical skills, 11
these disciplines have not prepared students for transnational practice.
One consequence of not preparing students for practice in transnational
law is that these disciplines are marginalized12 within the law school

to leave the home jurisdiction.
8. PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW l-2 (1956); see also Goebel, supra
note 3.
9. See Robert Macerate et al., Legal Education and Professional DevelopmentAn Educational Continuum: Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the
Profession: Narrowing the Gap, A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADM. TO Tiffi BAR
passim (1992) [hereinafter MacCrate, Report] (scrutinizing the well-established model).
10. See, for example, Alejandro M. Garro, The Teaching ofLatin American Legal
Systems in U.S. Law Schools, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 271,272, 275-76 (1988), for a history
and survey of teaching courses on Latin America, indicating, generally, the comparative
nature of Latin American law courses.
11. See Gunter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Rethinking Comparative Law,
26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411, 412 (1985) (noting that comparative law courses seek to
'deprovincialize' and 'cross-fertilize' "the minds of law students and teachers and
[provide] a 'meeting of the minds' and easier cooperation between lawyers here and
abroad"); see also Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical
Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811 passim (1990) (reviewing international law studies
including, inter alia, theoretical approaches to teaching international law [public relations
of governments] and recent expanded areas of international law [private parties' relations
with governments based on international treaties]).
12. See Frankenberg, supra note 11, at 419-20 (emphasizing the limited interest
that law schools have had in offering comparative law courses which have had to be
"'squeezed' out of the law school[;]" and, concomitantly, the limited interest of law
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curriculum. 13 Other areas of transnational law, such as the domestic
law of other nations (i.e., foreign law), 14 have largely been ignored. A
few law schools have offered some courses in foreign law. 15 Only one
school has offered a course in foreign law in its domestic language. 16
The philosophy underlying the typical law school curriculum has been
to prepare students for the practice of law by teaching them the basic
substantive common law through the case law method. It is assumed
that when students enter the profession, they will apply the learned
methodology and general concepts of the common law to their chosen
area of practice. 17 It is further assumed that the same methodology and
analytical approach will suffice for practice in the areas of transnational
law. The latter assumption is erroneous. Since civil law, not common
law, is practiced in the great majority of foreign legal systems, the

professors and students in the area because it has been perceived to be "quite
unattractive and unrewarding . . . [professionally because it has been unprofitable]")
(citing H. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW 23 (2d.ed. 1949)). See Trimble, supra note
11, at 811-12 (referring to the lack of interest by law schools and law professors in
international law) (citing John King Gamble, Jr. & Natalie S. Shields, International
Legal Scholarship: A Perspective on Teaching and Publishing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 39,
40 ( 1989)). Like Frankenberg, Trimble claims that the marginalization of international
law is due in part to deficiencies in scholarship in the area.
13. The exception has been the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law
at Columbia University.
14. At common law, "foreign law" encompasses both the law of sister states and
the domestic law of foreign countries. In this article, the term "foreign law" refers to
the latter.
15. Boalt Hall, for example, has intermittently offered Japanese Contract Law.
Telephone Conference with University of California School of Law, Boalt Hall
Registrar's Office (Oct. 23, 1997). Two schools, the University ofHouston, Law Center,
and Southern Methodist University, have specifically offered courses on Mexico from
a comparative law perspective. See Garro, supra note 10, at 272.
16. St. Mary's University of San Antonio, Texas, recently offered a Mexican law
course in Spanish by a Mexican law professor. Telephone Interview with Professor
Roberto Rosas, Visiting Professor from the Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico,
Guadalajara (Oct. 20, 1995). Professor Garro's survey of 1986 showed that ''no teacher
[answering the survey] reported having the primary course objective of providing
intensive training in one or more Latin American legal systems." See Garro, supra note
10, at 275.
For an approach emphasizing the teaching of foreign language in law school, see
Vivian Curran, Developing and Teaching a Foreign-Language Course for Law Students,
43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 598 (1993), indicating that the University of Pittsburgh School of
Law has offered "French for Lawyers" since 1989, "German for Lawyers" since 1993,
and will expand the foreign-language curriculum to include other languages. The
courses are "designed to familiarize students with the [foreign] language in a legal
context." Id. at 598. See also Frank M. Lacey & Jose Garcia Reyes, Training in

Foreign Languages for Students of Transnational Law: Advanced Legal and Business
Spanish at Vanderbilt Law School, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 657 (1981). As of the writing
of this article, this course was no longer being offered.
17. See, e.g., Macerate, Report, supra note 9, at 4.
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typical law school curriculum fails to train studentes properly for the
transnational marketplace. 18
For practical and parochial reasons, law schools have not offered
foreign law courses (either in English or in their domestic language).
Unquestioningly, law schools have considered it unnecessary to offer
foreign law courses because students traditionally entered only the local
marketplace, and therefore, the logical focus of study was U.S. American
law. Moreover, law schools have considered it impractical to include
these courses in the curriculum because they would exacerbate already
limited law school resources, present linguistic and cultural obstacles,
and create logistic difficulties. 19 In addition, an attitude of "parochialism, and a tradition of 'consecrated ignorance' of foreign laws"20 has
pervaded the law school curriculum. The foregoing factors have resulted
in a lack of both scholarly interest and institutional and practitioner
support.21 Thus, practitioners interested in the transnational marketplace have had to educate themselves about that marketplace without the
benefit of substantive legal education and training. 22

18. See Goebel, supra note 3 (criticizing the law school curriculum model because
it does not properly prepare students for the domestic marketplace). See, e.g., Macerate,
Report, supra note 9, at 330-334 (providing guidelines for solutions to the problems
raised by lack of skills training in legal education in the recommendations' section,
"Enhancing Professional Development During the Law School Years").
19. See Frankenberg, supra note 11, 419-20 (citing Pound, The Passing of
Mainstreetism, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 3 (A. von
Mehren & J. Hazard eds. 1961), and Hessel E. Yntema, Comparative Legal Research,
54 MICH. L. REV. 899 (1956)). Professor Frankenberg notes the criticism leveled by
comparativists against the law school curriculum model concerning academicians'
prejudice toward their discipline. This same criticism applies equally to the concept of
offering foreign law courses, and foreign law courses in their domestic language, which
has resulted in their exclusion from the law school curriculum.
20. Id. at 420.
21. See Garro, supra note 10, at 276 (indicating a lack of interest on the part of
full-time faculty). A poorly attended conference on Latin America and Law School
Curricula held in 1986 at UCLA supports Professor Garro's survey showing a lack of
interest in the area.
22. By comparison, the Faculties of Law of some European universities have
offered courses in foreign law as a regular part of the curriculum. A "fairly typical"
curriculum in German Faculties of Law, such as that of the University of Saarland, has
included since 1975 an elective track of study including, in addition to comparative and
international law courses, Fundamentals of French Law I and II. See RUDOLF B.
SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 167-68 (5th ed. 1988), citing W. K. Geck, The
Reform ofLegal Education in the Federal Republic of Germany, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 86,
111-115 (1977). In addition, some European universities offer foreign law courses in
their domestic language. For example, since 1969, an entire law school, The Center for
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The paradigm shift that is occurring in the legal profession due to
globalization should be the impetus for a concomitant paradigm shift in
legal education.23 Because of globalization, practitioners (beyond the
elite law firms) are beginning to offer more services in individual foreign
countries' laws in addition to their typical common law practice. Yet,
the majority of these firms do not have lawyers on staff trained in the
area of foreign law in which they offer services. For example, a brief
survey24 of firms that identified themselves as dedicating a portion of
their practice to areas of Mexican law showed that less than thirty
percent indicated they had Mexican-law trained attorneys on staff in the
United States. If the remaining firms are not using Mexican law
consultants or experts, and they are not acting only as conduits for
finding Mexican counsel, then they must be practicing Mexican law in
the United States based on experience gained solely on their U.S.
American practice. At a minimum, these firms are practicing Mexican
law based on the assumption that they have the ability to gain such
expertise.
Lawyers who do not command both a conscious and an intuitive
understanding of concepts embodied in the terms they and their
colleagues use are, at a minimum, ineffectual, if not in competent, in

the Study of English and American Law, University of Clermont, France, has been
dedicated to offering a degree in English and American law [the courses being taught
in English], simultaneously with a degree in French law. See Allen Sultan, Teaching
American Law to French Law Students-In English, 29 J. LEGAL Eouc. 577 (1978). At
the University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, a course on English law has been taught
in English since at least 1989. See PA1RICIA KINDER-GEST, MANDEL, DROIT ANGLAIS
(Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence 2d ed., 1993).
23. There is no universal acceptance of this position. For a contrary opinion, see
Chapman & Tauber, supra note 7.
24. This cursory survey was conducted on WestLaw electronic service file WLD.
The author notes that only twenty-five law firms were included in the WLD directory.
However, she believes that the number of firms reporting that they dedicate a portion of
their practice to Mexican law is extremely low. She personally knows of ten firms
providing such legal services who are neither included in the WLD directory nor in
Martindale-Hubell and who do not have Mexican-law trained attorneys on staff. She
believes that there is a high incidence of lawyers, particularly in the southwestern states,
who are not trained in Mexican law, yet they provide such services. See also Michael
W. Gordon, Symposium: The United States and Mexican Competition and Trade Law,
Part One: Establishing an Agency or Distributorship in Mexico, 4 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 71,
72 (1996) (noting that an area which has long been overlooked since the ratification of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the increase of "a great deal
· more common trade" and litigation concerning individuals and entities within the
NAFTA region. "We need to look more at the problems of the people in the trenches,
the problems of blockage at the border, bills of lading and similar subjects .... With
more trade comes more commercial litigation .... We have two very different systems
in which that litigation may take place.").
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their lawyering.25 Therefore, lawyers who do not command the law,
language, and culture in which they are counselling their clients, whether
for transactional or litigation purposes, are not performing their duties
competently and ethically,26 are courting malpractice27 on a personal
level, and, on a broader level, are undermining the legitimacy of the
profession. 28
This article is a call to law schools to broaden their academic horizons
to include elective courses in transnational practice by providing

25. Although this article does not deal with local issues regarding tlie importance
of culture and language in the legal arena within the United States, these issues should
not be overlooked. We live in a culturally and linguistically diverse society and our
laws at various instances throughout history have either protected "diversity" as legally
valid or refused to recognize it. See, e.g., Hill, infra note 113 passim. Nonetheless, we
are a multicultural society and there is a reasonable likelihood that practitioners are
going to have clients culturally and linguistically different from themselves and,
consequently, it behooves law schools to train future lawyers to function in this
multicultural market. See also Burnele V. Powell, Somewhere Farther Down the Line:
Macerate on Multiculturalism and the Information Age, 69 WASH. L. REV. 637, 648-49
(1994).
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 & Rule l. l cmt.
(1983) ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation."). See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-4 (1983) ("Having undertaken representation, a lawyer should use
proper care to safeguard the interests of his client. If a lawyer has accepted employment
in a matter beyond his competence but in which he expected to become competent, he
should diligently undertake the work and study necessary to qualify himself.").
27. See Waxman, supra note 4, at 392-94. Waxman notes that "the rise in
professional liability insurance claims [is] based on 'failure to understand international
and foreign substantive law."' Id. at 393 (quoting Telephone Interview with Alice
Hughey, Risk Management Coordinator, American Bar Association [Aug. 12, 1991]).
See also Chapman & Tauber, supra note 7, at 943 (noting that "[g]lobalization has made
domestic regulation [of lawyers] more difficult because it increases the complexity of
the interactions between lawyers, the legal system, and the authorities responsible for
regulating the legal profession" [citing Trubek, supra note 7, at 418]).
28. See FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. See also Waxman, supra note 4, at 393-94.
Professor Waxman voices a strong opinion as to the potential for undermining the
profession where the profession relies primarily on the judiciary to raise issues of foreign
law because the profession is inadequately trained to do so. He states:
Although elective judicial intervention may assure the appropriate result in
some instances, the nature of our adversarial system requires that attorney
competence be vigorously enforced. Thus, while lawyer incompetence may
affect individual cases, an overall lack of familiarity with foreign legal systems
by virtually the entire bar not only invites malpractice, but also undermines the
validity of our legal system itself.

Id.
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specialized courses in foreign law, taught in their domestic languages,29
so that students are trained in the basic legal structures, laws, legal
terminology, and culture of other nations. The purpose is to train future
practitioners to be competitive in the expanding legal marketplace30 by
furnishing courses that will provide a minimum level of competence in
areas of practice regarding foreign law, culture, and legal language.31
This article argues that Mexican law, culture, and Spanish legal
language is of particular interest to U.S. American legal education

29. See, e.g., Lacey & Reyes, supra note 16, at 657. It is recognized that some,
maybe many, students will be unable to take such a course because it will require a
minimum working knowledge of the foreign language being used. However, there has
been an increased interest in studying foreign languages in college at both the
undergraduate and graduate levels. See, e.g., Russell Gold, Accent Now is on Spanish College Enrollment in Language Soars, SAN ANToNIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 10, 1996,
at 1B (reporting that the Modem Language Association of America's (MLA) survey for
1995 showed that over 1.3 million college students are studying a foreign language. The
MLA survey also showed that 53% of college students studying language, study Spanish,
and also showed that, for the first time since the 19th century, a single language is being
studied by over 50% of college students [in the 19th century, Greek and Latin were the
preferred languages]). See also Deb Riechmann, Courses in Chinese, Arabic Gain on
European Tongues, THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Oct. 9, 1996, at 22 (noting that
while Spanish remains the language most studied on college campuses, Chinese and
Arabic are the fastest growing).
Furthermore, Professor Curran, supra note 16, at 601 n.4, indicates that a course
devoted to emphasizing the linguistic aspect rather than the legal aspect of the foreign
law is not problematic even to students who have never studied the language before
where cognates are widely used. She has also noted that, according to student
evaluations, the French legal language course is well received by the students. Over a
period of four years, many students have taken the course in order to use the language
skill in their practice. Id. at 605.
Also, increased immigration from other countries creates a ready pool of foreign
language speakers. It should be acknowledged that Hispanics and Hispanic-Americans
will constitute the largest minority population in the United States. Their interests will
be linked on a practical level to the interests of individuals remaining in their country
of origin, principally Mexico. See Greg Johnson, Fast-Food Firms Learn Lessons ofEl
Mercado, L.A. TIMES, ORANGE COUNTY EDITION, Oct. 8, 1996, at Al (stating that there
is a population of approximately 29 million Spanish speakers in the United States and
their current purchasing power is over $220 billion per year, both of which are growing
at approximately 30% per year, with the greatest concentration of population and dollars
spent in the areas of Los Angeles and Orange County, California).
30. See Goebel, supra note 3 passim. See also Chapman & Tauber, supra note 7.
31. See In re Roel, 3 N.Y.2d 224, 144 N.E.2d 24, 28, 165 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1957)
(holding that counsel retained in a matter concerning foreign law, "are responsible to the
client for the proper conduct of the matter, and may not claim that they are not required
to know the law of the foreign State (citation omitted)"). See also In re Disciplinary
Action David L. Curl, 803 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding counsel violated professional responsibility standards, including his duty to the court and to his client, when he
unintentionally mischaracterized a Mexican judgment. Attorney Curl relied on the
meaning and legal effect of the judgment based on his client's representation and an
opinion of Mexican counsel obtained in conversation, where both counsel barely spoke
each other's language.). See also Waxman, supra note 4, at 393.
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because knowledge in these areas will provide the greatest access to the
transnational markets of the Northern and Southern American hemispheres. Mexico's border with the United States (and the United States'
border with Canada) has resulted in the creation of the largest regional
trade partnership in the world: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA is comprised of 350 million persons. 32 After
Canada and Japan, 33 Mexico is the United States' largest trade partner.
NAFTA not only has opened the door to formal trade and investment
but also has recognized shared environmental concerns. All of these
factors contribute to an increase of informal contacts and transactions
among citizens of Canada, the United States, and Mexico, leading to an
increased economic and cultural integration of the region. 34 Furthermore, Mexico is acknowledged as being the gateway to Latin America.35 Law schools should recognize both the impact of NAFTA on

32. Zamora, supra note 2, at 401. It is agreed that it is larger than the European
Community (EC). "The population of the North American market [will] be 30 million
larger than the EC (360 million vs. 326 million) and [is estimated to] produce more than
$6 trillion a year in goods and services (compared with the EC's approximately $4.5
trillion)." CANDACE BANCROFT McKINNiss & ARTHUR NATELLA, JR., BUSINESS IN
MEXICO 48 (1994).
33. The teaching of Japanese law is also of great interest because of Japan's trade
partnership status with the United States and should not be overlooked. See Kenneth L.
Port, The Case for Teaching Japanese Law at American Law Schools, 43 DEPAUL L.
REV. 643 (1994). Professor Port advocates that law schools teach a comparative course
of Japanese law in English, because Japanese law "is extremely culture-based; . . . [it
is] closely allied with cultural values, values which are [very different from ours and]
as much as two thousand years old .... [And, although] Japan has confronted problems
very similar to those of the West, with very similar Western statutes, [it] has come to
completely distinct results." Id. at 648-49.
34. Zamora, supra note 2, at 401. See also Gordon, supra note 24 passim.
35. See Mario L. Baeza, Investment and Trade in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico
and Venezuela, 259, 263 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series
No. A4-4397, Dec. 7-8, 1992), stating:
Mexico is . . . perceived as a gateway to other countries in Latin America.
Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia, for example, recently announced their
intention to establish a free trade zone, and Chile is considering joining them.
A strategic acquisition or joint venture with a major Mexican company may
soon permit a U.S. firm not only to take advantage of increased sales in
Mexico, but also to be accorded barrier-free entry into other Latin American
countries.
Id. See also John Jennings, National Underwriter Property & Casualty-Risk & Benefits
Management, Investors Slowly Gaining Confidence in Mexican Market (Sept. 25, 1995);
Stephanie B. Goldberg, South of the Border, 80 A.B.A. J. 74 (1994); and Bronwen
Davis, Comment, Mexico's Commercial Banki.ng Industry: Can Mexico's Recently
Privatized Banks Compete with the United States Banki.ng Industry After Enactment of
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formal and informal transactions among citizens of the NAFTA partners
and Mexico's prominent role amid its Latin American neighbors, and
adjust the law school curriculum accordingly.36
This article discusses why foreign law should be taught in its cultural
context and in its domestic language. It also explores the multiple
relationships among law, language, and culture, and suggests the need
to teach foreign law courses in their domestic language due to globalization. It proposes that: (1) U.S. American law schools should be offering
courses in the law of other countries; (2) the courses should be in the
domestic language of those countries in order to provide an understanding and appreciation of the legal system, culture, and language of those
countries; (3) the countries likely to have the most significant relationship with the United States in the twenty-first century are its foremost
trading partners, Canada, Mexico, and Japan, and at a minimum, law
schools should offer a year-long course in one of these countries' legal
systems, culture, and language; and, (4) Mexico is a logical place to start
because of NAFTA and Mexico's prominent role in Latin America.37
This article concludes that: (1) practice in areas of transnational law will
require the soundest training possible;38 (2) the soundest training
possible includes teaching foreign law in the domestic language of the
particular legal system; and (3) understanding law in the context of the
culture and language of which it is a part is essential in the study of the
law of another country.

the North American Free Trade Agreement?, 10 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 77, 107
(1993) (emphasizing the leadership role that Mexico plays in Latin America, citing
Deidre McMurdy & John Daly, Clearing the Final Hurdles; Trade Ministers Agonize
Over Final Touches to a Continental Trade Pact, MACLEAN'S, Aug. 17, 1992, at 26).
36. In Latin America, Spanish is spoken by approximately half a billion persons
and represents an enormous future market of goods and services. See Gearing Up For
Mexico and Beyond, THE FINANCIAL POST, Sept. 1, 1992, at 8.
37. The Canadian legal system, its culture and language, insofar as it differs from
the U.S. American legal system, including, but not limited to the Quebe!;ois legal
system, should also be considered as part oflegal education. See Arthur T. von Mehren,
The Significance of Cultural and Legal Diversity for International Transactions, 1-2 Ius
PRIVATUM GENTIUM 247 (Ernst von Caemmerer, et al. eds., 1969) passim.
38. A word should be said concerning the choice of not proposing that foreign law
be taught in English. Although teaching a foreign law course in English is the manner
in which such courses have been taught traditionally (and, at a minimum, this is better
than offering no such course at all), it is well recognized that the best grasp of the legal
culture and use of applicable law takes place via the language of the legal system being
studied. This approach provides the soundest basis for competent practice. See Lacey
& Reyes, supra note 16.
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II.

THE

IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING CULTURE AND LANGUAGE
IN THE STUDY OF LAW

Generally, legal education has ignored both the role of culture and
language and the relationship of culture and language to the study of law
in the classroom. When included in legal education, culture and
language have been addressed in limited ways, primarily as part of
survey courses such as comparative and international law.39 Culture
and language are difficult to study because they are meta-systems
comprised of objective and subjective qualities that permeate individual
experience and cognition. Consequently, the nature and properties of
culture and language, and their important role within. the context of the
study of law, are difficult to conceptualize.40
This section first explores culture and law beginning with a brief
historical review of analytical approaches applied in the area. Next, it
discusses the intersection between culture and law from the perspective

39. But see Rosemary F. Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics of
Possessing Identity, in AFTER IDENTITY, A READER IN LAW AND CULTURE 251 (Dan
Danielson & Karen Engle eds., 1995).
40. Culture is a conundrum. Is there a single "human or meta-culture" or are there
many "group cultures" or "subcultures?" If there are many cultures, are they defined by
nationality, by geography, by status (e.g., age, marital status, profession, class, religion,
political interests, and power relationships), by history or by any combination of the
above? How does the creation of culture take place? What is the relationship between
individuals and cultures? Can individuals from one culture fully understand another
culture and become proficient in the latter? What is the relationship between law and
culture? How does culture shape law and how does law shape culture?
The questions regarding language are not any easier, but on one level they are not as
subtle as the questions pertinent to culture. On the one hand, language does not present
such subtle issues because language is objectified through repetitive and consistent use
of symbols, grammatical structures, meanings, sounds, intonation, and accent. On the
other hand, language raises more subtle issues when one asks, what is the relationship
between individuals and language? How do individuals relate to each other through
language? Why do misunderstandings occur even when individuals speak the same
language? Can individuals truly understand the meaning of a language which is not the
language of their culture of origin? How does language affect law, and therefore, the
lives of those creating laws, implementing them, and those subject to them? Are there
linguistic differences across cultures that are impenetrable? Does language form
worldview to the extent that it determines how we interpret our surroundings, including
legal constructs?
These questions indicate the complexity involved in analyzing culture and language,
and their relationship to law. They will form the background of the analyses provided
in this section.
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of current interdisciplinary approaches to legal theory. This section then
addresses the relationship of language and culture to the study of law
and how language and culture shape and influence each other. A
subsection describes the role of "soft law',4 1 as part of the legal culture
of developing societies, and emphasizes the importance of knowledge of
"soft law" for practitioners of foreign law. This section then scrutinizes
linguistic and cultural competency and the law, specifically in the area
of foreign law. It ends with a brief discussion of the role of comparative
and international law in legal education. This section underscores the
important relationship between culture, language, and law because legal
educators can no longer ignore the need to educate law students in
specialized areas of foreign law.

A.
I.

Culture and Law
An Historical Note

Traditionally,culture was defined as the study of ''primitive" people's
customs, artifacts, and oral traditions.42 Early anthropologists and other
social scientists characterized culture as consisting of a fixed set of
categories and simple human interactions.43 Thus, social scientists
viewed culture as static, unicausal, and determinist.44 These notions

41. "Soft law," here, refers to developing societies' declared aspirations which are
written and found in international organizations' pronouncements and those countries'
operational codes which may or may not be written. See Michael W. Gordon, Of
Aspirations and Operations: The Governance of Multinational Enterprises by Third
World Nations, 16 INTER-AM. L. REV. 301 (1984) [hereinafter Gordon, Of Aspirations
and Operations].
42. See, e.g., RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM:
SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 27-28 (1983).
43. JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE 344 (Harv. Univ. Press,
1988) (questioning the assumptions that culture consists of a fixed set of categories and
simple interactions derived from a positivist approach to the study of culture in referring
to cultural identity and the problems raised by cultural contact).
Stories of cultural contact and change have been structured by a pervasive
dichotomy: absorption by the other or resistance to the other.... Yet what
if identity is conceived not as a boundary to be maintained but as a nexus of
relations and transactions actively engaging a subject? The story or stories of
interaction must then be more complex, less linear and teleological.
Id.
44. Joann Kovacich, The Legal and Social Construction of 'Culture', 19 LEGAL
STUD. F. 287, 290 (1995) (noting that a static view of culture, i.e., one that is unicausal
and determinist, has been criticized by many scholars recently who emphasize "fluidity
of cultural identities, ethnic boundaries and the negotiation of ethnicity among other
variables of identification such as age, gender, martial [sic] status, occupation, and
nationality in particular contexts"). I would add as variables: language, food, dress,
common history and place of origin, and values (including religious, philosophical, and
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were based on a positivist approach to the analysis of culture.45
Rationalism and scientism formed the basis of positivist theory which
reached its apogee during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.46 Under the rubrics of "scientism" and "rationalism,"
anthropologists and sociologists sought to classify cultural traits and
behavior of "primitive peoples."47 The rise of relativism, twice during
this century, changed the face of the study of culture. In the twenties,
anthropologist Ruth Benedict, an exponent of ethnographic relativism,
postulated there was no absolute standard for human behavior, and
consequently, for social institutions, due to the great and infinite variety
of social orders.48 Later, structuralism departed from the premise that
the relationship between cultural elements formed meaning and reasoned
that this relationship existed as a "deep structure" underlying all human
understanding. 49 Subsequently, anthropologists posited that there were
no objective accounts of behavioral facts (i.e., facts determined from
cultural context) and anthropologists merely interpreted these facts
through their own cultural construct. 50
In the field of law, rationalism and scientism contemporaneously
formed the basis of the positivist theory which still has some currency
today. 51 The ideological premise of this school of thought was the
assumption that universal rules existed· external to individuals and
societies. 52 It sought to establish "pure," "logical," or "analytical"
approaches to law which would allow for consistency, predictability, and

political values) within particular contexts.
45. See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM 52-58
(1983).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 28-29.
48. RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 71 (2d ed. 1960).
49. See Edmund Leach, Claude Levi-Straus~Anthropologist and Philosopher,
34 NEW LEFT REV. 12 (1965).
50. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES passim (1973).
51. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW passim (1961) and PETER
GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE 32-62 passim (1987). See also Katherine Sobota, Don't
Mention the Norm!, 4 INT'L J. FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW 45, 45 (1991) (emphasizing
that modem democratic legal systems, such as that of the United States, are "convinced
that law is a system constituted [solely] by explicit norms").
52. Sobota, supra note 51, at 45 {"The underlying idea of this movement was to
discover (or rediscover) a reasonable system which could regulate human behaviour by
means of a univocal, complete and comprehensive legal system ....").
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stability in legal decision making. 53 Legal realism, rooted in relativism,
rejected the doctrinal formalism approach of the positivist school. It
evolved into an empirical approach54 that attempted to establish that
facts were subject to objective legal analysis. 55 The theoretical
Achilles' heel of these schools of thought, highlighted by social
scientists, was that concepts of law and fact and the relationship between
law and fact vary cross-culturally. 56
Both the study of culture and law have suffered from the analytical
constraints of scientism and rationalism and their theoretical progeny. 57
The rise of both the theory of cultural relativism, and later, the theory
of subjectivism58 have given impetus to more varied, open-ended and
holistic, complex studies of the relationship between culture and law and
the study of legal discourse. This interdisciplinary approach has
flourished and is increasingly applied to a variety of legal studies. 59

53. Id. at 46.
54. According to this approach, law is what "courts do .... [That is,] lawyers
[from the Anglo-American legal realism tradition] conveniently remove themselves from
the debate .over the axioms of their discipline by assuming the attributes of a science,
thus focusing specifically on the predictive implications of a legal science." Michael
Saltman, Legal Realism in Cross-Cultural Context, 2 INT'L J. FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF
LAW 113, 113 (1989).
55. See Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and
the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 442 (1987), for an excellent
review of the development of legal thought in the United States.
56. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative
Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FuRTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY
167 (1983).
57. See Sobota, supra note 52; see also Saltman, supra note 54, at 114-15.
Professor Saltman contends that anthropology and sociology suffer from a similar
problem. "The mistake, that many sociologists and anthropologists make in inferring the
existence of norms, is the assumption of the sufficiency of their method of establishing
[the norms'] existence by means of the external observation of recurrent patterns of
behavior." Id.
58. See Frankenburg, supra note 11, at 414-16 {discussing the school of Critical
Legal Studies' perspective on the role of subjectivism in relation to comparative law).
59. See, e.g., Sobota, supra note 51, at 47-48, for a discussion of the concept of
"regularities" as a basis for analyzing legal norms within the School of Analytical
Rhetoric. These regularities:
[A]re dynamic cybernetic formations like the living network ofa cell or like
seasons, fashions, rituals or behavior patterns.... [They] do not direct or
control nature and they give no universal description of nature. They are part
of all living action; they organize these actions and they are produced by these
actions. . . . [S]uch changeable, self-organized patterns, . . . are often
articulated as rules, but really are only 'regularities'. [From this perspective,]
a legal text [is] a concrete technique used by a particular person in a specific
legal situation. The situation is regarded as an open system, which is
constituted by various influences, whether social, economic, cultural or
biological. The inner form of speech is regarded as a flexible regularity, rather
than as a permanent structure.
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2.

The Current Intersection Between Culture and Law

Social scientists, for the most part, have developed three major
perspectives as to the nature of culture: culture as "shared knowledge,''60 culture as "conceptual structures,"61 and culture as something
that falls between these two views. 62 This article departs from the
premise that culture is constituted of all three views. This article asserts
that culture consists of an accumulation of knowledge, including clusters
of norms, and that culture is a dynamic process that is intersubjectively
shared. 63
"Shared knowledge" is that knowledge which people must know in
order to behave in the manner they do, to produce the objects they do,
and to "interpret their experience in the distinctive way they do."64
Cultural knowledge is neither inert nor passive. It is an open and
hermeneutic process comprised of conceptual structures.
These
structures consist of the adaptation of cultural knowledge to daily
experiences, allowing individuals to understand their experiences
contextually, while simultaneously promoting cultural stability65
through normative systems. Written and oral language is an interpretive
experience and is one of several methods of cultural communication
which contributes to the flexibility and creativity of culture. 66
Id. For an example in the area of Bankruptcy law, see Kenneth D. Ferguson, Discourse
and Discharge: Linguistic Analysis and Abuse of the "Exemption by Declaration "
Process in Bankruptcy, 10 AM. BANK. L.J. 55 (1996), where the author performs a legal
and linguistic analysis of the false claim, false statement, and perjury issues within the
context of the bad faith claims exemption.
60. See Naomi Quinn & Dorothy Holland, Culture and Cognition, in CULTURAL
MODELS IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 3, 4 (Naomi Quinn & Dorothy Holland eds.,
1989).
61. Id. at 3-4. See also Roy G. D'Andrade, Types of Culture Theory, in CULTURE
THEORY 88, 114-16 (David Kaplan & Robert A. Manners eds., 1985).
62. D'Andrade, Types of Culture Theory, supra note 61, at 115.
63. Id. at 115-16.
64. Quinn & Holland, supra note 60, at 4.
65. Id. (stating that one of culture's properties is the "generative capacity" of
culture within the myriad of daily simple or complex experiences).
66. Paul E. Geller, Policy Consideration, Legal Transplants in International
Copyright: Some Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199, 207 (1994)
(noting that beginning with ''the linguistic dimension of relativism," one soon becomes
aware of the cultural dimensions oflanguage in the area of copyright law. Terms such
as "permanent cultural values" or "property" or ''the most sacred of properties" are
culturally bound.).
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Law engenders a complex, hermeneutic process which includes its
own specialized language and its own shared knowledge, i.e., "legal
culture." The field of law (or legal culture) has a recognizable internal
organization based on "protocols and assumptions, characteristic
behaviors and self-sustaining values" forming an incomplete but
autonomous social field. 67 Law is also fundamentally constitutive.
"[L]aw is intimately involved in the constitution of social relations and
the law itself is constituted through social relations.',68 Law could be
said to operate inseparably from society, and therefore, from culture.69

67. Richard Terdiman, Translator's Introduction to Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of
Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HAsTINGS L.J. 805, 806 (Richard
Terdiman trans., 1987).
68. Sally E. Merry, Culture, Power, and the Discourse ofLaw, 209 N.Y. L.R. 209
(1992).
69. Id. at 209-211. Anthropologist Sally Engle Merry states:
Daily talk about the law by ordinary people contributes to defining what the
law is and what it is not. Ordinary people share understandings of law and the
way it affects their lives and defines their relationships. These understandings,
which can be called legal consciousness, include people's expectations of the
law, their sense of legal entitlement, and their sense of rights. Popular legal
understanding is not necessarily the same as the professional understanding of
law . . . . Legal consciousness is fundamental in influencing who goes to court
with what problems because it shapes which problems are defined as worthy
of legal intervention and which are not. The legal system sets up expectations
for providing remedies; people use it, and as they do, they provide the social
problems on which the law works.
Id. at 209-10.
"[Furthermore, ] [l]awyers' practice is ... shaped by ... ideologies ...." Merry,
supra note 68, at 210, (citing Brinkley Messick, Kissing Hands and Knees: Hegemony
and Hierarchy in Shari'a Discourse, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 637 (1988)); Austin Sarat
& William L. F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 93, 125-28 (1986).
"[Lawyers' ideologies] come from [legal] training as well as general cultural
assumptions about conflict and relationships. More generally, as ... lawyers, and courts
handle problems, popular and professional conceptions of the law structure local
practices, including the way that problems are labeled and solutions determined." Merry,
supra note 68, at 211 (citing Lynn Mather & Barbara Yngvesson, Language, Audience,
and the Transformation ofDisputes, 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 775, 777-79 (1980-1981)).
"The ability to determine the way that cases are talked about and the relevant
discourse within which an issue is framed is an important facet of the law's power ...."
Merry, supra note 68, at 211 citing as examples: JOHN BRIGHAM, PROPERTY AND THE
POLITICS OF ENTITLEMENT (1990); JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLLAM M. O'BARR, RULES
VERSUS RELATIONSIIlPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990); Sally E.
Merry, Everyday Understanding of the Law in Working-Class America, 13 AM.
ETHNOWGIST 253 (1986); Messick, supra; William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Lay
Expectations of the Civil Justice System, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 137 (1988); William
M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small
Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 661 (1985); Austin Sarat & William
L. F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client
Interaction, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 737 (1988)).
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Law is local knowledge, a cultural institution compnsmg complex
processes which vary from place to place and period to period.70 Law,
therefore, may be characterized as a component of culture and the
relationship between law and culture is dynamic and creative. The stud-fi
of law has shallow meaning when abstracted from its cultural context. 1
A contextualist approach72 in the study of law suggests that human
beings always operate within social contexts and make decisions
contextually. 73 This approach74 assumes that the study and practice

See also JOHN COMAROFF & SIMON ROBERTS, RULES AND PROCESSES 6 (1986).
Anthropologists Comaroff and Roberts have developed an analytic model that helps to
understand how conflict talk creates meaning. They describe the process of constructing
an interpretation in disputing situations as the development of a paradigm of argument,
which they define as "a coherent picture of relevant events and actions in terms of one
or more implicit or explicit normative referents." Id. (emphasis in the original).
70. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative
Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FuR.THER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY
167, 175-219 passim (1983)).
71. See CLIFFORD, supra note 43, at 344. The complexity of cultural inquiry, in
the area of copyright law, is aptly illustrated by Geller, supra note 66, at 213-14. He
suggests applying a new paradigm, consisting of three questions, to ''troublesome cases"
of interpretation in complex cross-cultural settings where different norms might apply:
"First, who, in the community of legal practitioners, has power to interpret a rule?" Id.
at 213. [Is authority centralized in legislators, or is it decentralized in judges having
discretion to adjudicate on a case-by case basis?]; "[s]econd, what values and theory
direct the interpretation of rules?" Id. at 214. [Which values are universal in nature, such
as "equity and reliability" (which may be interpreted differently from culture to culture)
and which are limited to particular substantive fields; and, how are theories guiding
interpretation of legal terminology?]; and "[t]hird, what premises are assumed about the
facts to which rules are to apply in practice?" Id. [Different norms might apply,
depending on the factual assumptions being made which will be subject to the rules to
be applied]. The purpose is to understand the underlying normative values of the
particular society in order to arrive at an interpretation and application of law consistent
with the society's norms.
72. A "systemic normativist" approach propounded by HANS KELSEN, PuRE
THEORY OF LAW 4-6 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 2d ed. 1967) (1934), is
consistent with the contextualist approach. The systemic normativist approach is
premised on the theory that only rules which may be structured consonantly with the
particular society's norms in which they are going to be applied should be adopted
because these will engender values of the particular society.
73. Coombe, supra note 39, at 266-67.
74. The contextualist approach has been criticized as being relativistic, undermining moral judgments and the generation of abstract principles of law which guide a
society. Coombe posits that considering the specific cultural circumstances with which
individuals are concerned "neither incapacitates us from making moral judgments nor
undermines the possibility of criticism across contexts." Id. at 266. Moreover, critics
of the contexualist approach fail to recognize that they themselves (like everybody else)
contribute to and operate in a cultural milieu.
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of law is contextually based, forming part of the greater field of shared
cultural knowledge and the conceptual constructs that form culture.75
For example, when ideas are abstracted to general principles of law,
decision-makers and practitioners (as well as law professors and
students) employ a choice of relevant cultural contexts that ~ve meaning
to and determine the effect of general principles of law. 6 "Abstract
theories . . . are 'rooted in particular contexts and operate within a
context with real and particular effects that often benefit some people
more than others. "'77 ·
The cultural context in which the parties in a legal matter, practitioners, and decision-makers, operate must be recognized and analyzed to
understand the context for legal choices and decision-making.78
Furthermore, unless practitioners and decision-makers are aware that they
operate in a cultural context and are aware that their perception is
culturally predisposed and delimits their comprehension,79 their
understanding of others' cultural knowledge, including foreign legal
systems, will be severely limited.80
·
In the area of foreign law and legal systems, knowledge of one's
cultural assumptions is crucial81 because choices are drawn from
cultural contexts with which the individual may or may not be familiar.82 The individual may unwittingly superimpose her cultural
interpretation on the foreign legal system which will create problems
because she failed to examine her cultural assumptions.83 Culture and
law, as cultural institutions, are objective (social) and subjective

75. Id. at 266-267. See also Michael W. Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad: Cultural
Variations Affecting Franchising Abroad, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 165 (1994)[hereinafter
Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad].
76. Coombe, supra note 39, at 266-67.
77. Id. at 267 (citing Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, in
PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 247 {Michael Brint and William Weaver eds.,
1991)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See von Mehren, supra note 37, at 249 (noting that "individuals with
significantly different cultural or traditional backgrounds," find it very difficult "even
upon mature reflection, to assess the risk of misunderstanding that may inhere in a
situation" when dealing with legal matters involving transnational issues).
81. See Frankenberg, supra note 11, at 414-16.
82. See, e.g., von Mehren, supra note 37, at 249. Professor von Mehren notes that
often there is greater danger of misunderstanding where apparent similarities exist in the
legal devices being used, because a practitioner may draw a conclusion that is a
"comfortable-but potentially dangerous-assumption that other elements (for example,
legal traditions and practices) are equally comparable." Id.
83. Id.

652

[VOL. 34: 635, 1997]

Legal Education
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

(interpretive;, experiences which require reflection and awareness by the
practitioner. 4

B.

"Clash of Cultural Contexts": A Jewish-Iranian Legal Device in
the Hands of a U.S. American Court

A California appellate family law case, In re Matter of Noghrey, 85
serves to illustrate the significant legal and cultural ramifications of a
judicial decision involving parties from another culture and the court's
cultural assumptions. The case underscores: (1) the contextualist nature
of legal devices and of abstract theory in judicial decision making; and
(2) the constitutive theory of law.
·
In Noghrey, husband and wife had entered into a prenuptial agreement,
a kethuba (defined infra), pursuant to the customs of the Jewish-Iranian
culture.86 The agreement provided for a "house ... and $500,000.00,
or one-half of [husband's] assets, whichever is greater" to go to the wife
in the event of a divorce. 87 In exchange for the kethuba, as prescribed
by Jewish-Iranian cultural norms, the wife affirmed that she was a virgin
and provided the requisite medical proof. 88
The appellate court acknowledged the cultural basis of the kethuba and
summarily dismissed the kethuba device, holding it unenforceable on
public policy grounds because it promoted divorce. 89 In its opinion, the

84. Id.
85. 169 Cal. App. 3d 326, 215 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985).
86. Id. at 328, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
87. Id. at 328-29, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 154-55.
88. Id. at 328, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 155. See Rachel B. Wischnitzer, Kethubah, in 6
THE UNIVERSAL JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA 367, 372 (Isaac Landman et al. eds., 1942),
which provides a sample text of an Eastern European Kethuba which does not need to
be signed by the bride nor groom, although the groom often executes it. She states:
On the .......th day of the week, on the .......th of the month ...... in
the year . . . .. . . . after the creation of the world, the era according to which
we are accustomed to reckon in the city of X., N., son of M., spoke to the
virgin A., daughter of B., as follows: " Be my wife according to the law of
Moses and Israel, and I will work for you, honor you, and maintain you,
according to the manner of Jewish men, who work for their wives, honor
them, nourish them, and provide for them in truth. I will also give you the
morning-gift of your virginity, 200 denarii in silver coins, which belong to you
according to the Torah, as well as your food, your clothing, and all your needs,
and will live with you in conjugal relations."
Id.
89. In re Noghrey, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 328-30, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 154-56.
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court referred to the long-standing public policy against enforcing
premarital agreements that provide for a spouse only in the event of a
divorce. 90 The court reasoned that, if it were to hold otherwise, the
kethuba would discourage husbands from divorcing their spouses but
would encourage wives to do so.91 According to the court, the husband
would find it :fiscally imprudent to divorce. The wife, however, not only
would be encouraged to divorce, she would be likely to do so "lest the
husband suffer an untimely demise, nullifying the contract, and the
wife's right to the money and property."92
Abstracted from the Jewish-Iranian cultural context, the kethuba
appears to be promoting divorce. The court interpreted the kethuba
agreement based on the court's own cultural assumption that all women
are likely to divorce in order to receive an economic windfall. The
public policy appears "logical" and "equitable," since, without the
kethuba, both parties would be free to divorce without either the burden
of an economic penalty or the expectation of an economic windfall.
However, this result is not logical nor equitable if analyzed from the
perspective of the culture in which the kethuba device arose, in which
divorced women lack economic security because of cultural constraints.
The kethuba is premised on Jewish-Iranian cultural and religious93
norms and values. The kethuba is a contractual device designed both to
provide :financial security for the wife and to discourage divorce by
significantly limiting the husband :financially.94
Several reasons
justified burdening the husband :financially. In Jewish-Iranian culture,
the husband has a right to divorce and remarry at will. 95 The wife has
a limited right to divorce and suffers a "loss of reduction of her rights
should she divorce her husband on certain grounds."96 In addition,
virginity is highly valued in this culture, and the wife in this case offered
proof of her virginity before marriage. 97 Thus, the wife's loss of
virginity, because of her marriage, severely limits remarriage.98 With
very limited opportunities to remarry within the culture, it could
reasonably be inferred that the wife would become a :financial burden on
90. Id.
91. Id. at 331, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
92. Id.
93. The court specifically refused to address the kethuba 's religious premises,
claiming that such an analysis would raise anti-establishment clause issues. Id. at 329,
215 Cal. Rptr. at 155 n.2. The kethuba's religious connotations need not be discussed
here. For this analysis, secular cultural norms underlying the kethuba suffice.
94. In re Noghrey, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 329, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 155 n.2.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 328, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
98. Id. at 328, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 154-55.
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her family if she did not have a kethuba agreement (providing for her
economic security in the event of divorce) with the husband prior to
marriage. The kethuba equalizes the "playing field" by providing for the
wife's economic security by intentionally burdening the husband
financially in the event of divorce. Therefore, the kethuba is a cultural
device promotive of marriage, rather than promotive. of divorce, as
reasoned by the appellate court.
In this case, the court's failure to recognize both that the kethuba
promoted marriage rather than divorce and the cultural impact on the
wife caused by its refusal to enforce the kethuba, in fact, shifted the
balance in favor of the husband under U.S. American norms. Additionally, the court's gratuitous comments regarding the reasons as to why
husband and wife are likely to stay married in the Jewish-Iranian culture
pursuant to the kethuba are based on U.S. American stereotypes99 of
men being "commonsensical" and ''fiscally prudent" and wom~n being
"golddiggers." Culturally, in this case, the wife's hardship was
exacerbated because, if she expected to remarry, she probably would
have to do so outside of her culture because of her loss of virginity.
In the interests of fairness, the court could have considered the cultural
context of the kethuba and remanded the matter to determine whether or
not the wife was sufficiently acculturated to U.S. American society to
ensure that her loss of virginity would not create an undue hardship. If
the wife was sufficiently acculturated to U.S. American society, then the
lack of enforcement of the kethuba would not create a significant
hardship; if she were not, then the enforcement of the kethuba might
well be required to prevent undue hardship because it would be
unacceptable for her to marry outside of the Jewish-Iranian culture. In
the latter instance, the court would have had the power to hold that the
kethuba did not violate public policy because it was not promotive of
divorce, and, instead, enforce the kethuba in the interests of the stated
public policy and fairness.
Alternatively, in Noghrey, the court could have reasoned more soundly
by recognizing both the constitutive nature of the law and the
contextualist basis of judicial decision-making, and acknowledging that,
because of the multicultural nature of U.S. American society, the
"standardization" of legal norms is a highly valued principle in U.S.

,

99.

Id.
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American legal culture. Thus, the court could have concluded that the
need to maintain a standardized public policy regarding non-enforcement
of premarital agreements (that settle property on one of the two spouses
only in the event of a divorce) outweighed upholding the kethuba. The
court could have strengthened its decision by noting that the kethuba
could be used to promote divorce in U.S. American culture, in which
other Jewish-Iranian cultural constraints, such as the limitation on a
divorced woman's remarrying, might not be operating.
This case is an example of the failure by a court to analyze the
meaning of a legal device within its cultural context. The court, instead,
substituted its own cultural predispositions without question. The court
in Noghrey, by recognizing the limitations of its own worldview, might
have considered different and better reasoned bases for its decision. The
court could have considered the normative value of standardization in
this society's multicultural context, or, alternatively, remanded the matter
to determine whether or not the kethuba, in this instance, was or was not
promotive of divorce. If the kethuba was not promotive of divorce, the
court could have considered whether fairness required that the court be
more protective of the wife's rights. The court would also have avoided
perpetuation of U.S. American cultural stereotypes that stigmatize based
on gender in its decision making.

1.

Legal Culture and "Soft Law"

"Soft law" 100 is an important aspect of legal culture 101 in develop-

100. See Gunther F. Handl, A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 AM. Soc'y OF INT'L LAW
PROC. 371-73 (1988) (opening remarks discussing that while "soft law'' is at the vortex
of intense debate among internationalists, there is no consensus as to its meaning). "Soft
law," according to noted internationalist, Michael W. Gordon, encompasses the
aspirational declarations of international organizations (written but not law) adopted by
developing nations, and unwritten law (i.e., unwritten law or written, but unpublished
laws) of international organizations and of developing societies. See Gordon, Of
Aspirations and Operations, supra note 41, at 302-13, 332-33. Professor Gordon defines
"aspirational declarations" as written statements that reflect the aspirations of developing
nations. Id. at 323. They emphasize goals or views of developing nations through
international organizations, such as the United Nations, and should not be overlooked.
These views represent an important element in the framework of governance
. . . by host nations. Emanating from a multi-nation organization, they
nevertheless illustrate an aggregate response by developing . . . nations. While
the policies of host nations often are not expressed in writing . . . they are
written and disclosed in the pronouncements of the multi-nation organizations.
Id. at 320. See also Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad, supra note 75, at 166-68.
101. Because of its aspirational and unwritten nature, "soft law" has been criticized
as not being law at all. See Michael Reisman's remarks in Handl, supra note 100, at
373-377, for a brief discussion of how soft law fails to meet lawmaking criteria. The
debate as to whether "soft law" is law or not law is inapposite to this discussion.
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ing nations, 102 pertinent to the training of future practitioners of
transnational law. 103 "Soft law" serves four functions in legal culture.
First, declared aspirations and unwritten law are often precursors to hard
law, i.e., written law. 104 Second, unwritten laws constitute the "~perational code" or the "way things really work" in the legal culture, 10 and
often determine legal matters. 106 For example, unwritten laws often
are "interpretations of laws," and therefore, attorneys must know about
unwritten laws in order to understand the meaning of a law in a foreign
country. 107 Third, "soft law" serves as an instrument of flexibility in
an era of change allowing for compromise and negotiation. 108 And,
fourth, "soft law" promotes stability during times of rapid change

102. See Gordon, Of Aspirations and Operations, supra note 41, at 320-25.
103. See Handl, supra note 100, at 372. Professor Handl notes the important role
of "soft law'':
[An abundance of examples exist concerning] formal international law such as
treaties, whose ineffectiveness relegates them to the ranks of nonlegal norms,
or, if you will, soft norms, notwithstanding their formal status. And vice
versa, there is an abundance of, formally speaking, nonnormative documents
such as resolutions and declarations of international organizations or
conferences, which have proved to be highly effective internationally and must
be deemed part and parcel of international normative order.
Id. (Emphasis added). See also Gordon, OfAspirations and Operations, supra note 41,
and Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad, supra note 75 passim, which examine some problems
that practitioners encounter in the international area due to lack of cultural knowledge
or misunderstanding.
104. Aspirational declarations of nations usually precede enactment of domestic law
and aspirational declarations of international organizations often transmute into
customary law. See Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad, supra note 75, at 166-67.
105. See Gordon, OfAspirations and Operations, supra note 41, at 302-13, 332-33;
see also, Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad, supra note 75, at 166.
106. Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad, supra note 75, at 167-69. Professor Gordon
provides various examples of such "laws" from around the world. For example, in
Mexico, a U.S. American fast food company was denied a waiver of mandatory joint
venture provisions based on, inter alia, a reluctance to permit the particular style of
American cooking involved. In Brazil, government officials determine on an ad hoc
basis whether or not to apply "drawer regulations" to foreign investment applications.
"Drawer regulations," as they are known by Brazilian attorneys, remain unknown to the
lawyer until the official decides to pull them out of the drawer, literally. And in China,
certain regulations, although written, are not for dissemination to foreigners, and
therefore, foreign attorneys lack any knowledge as to their existence until they are
applied to a matter they are handling.
107. Id. at 183.
.
108. Handl, supra note 100, at 375-76 (discussing the importance of soft law in
resolving deadlocks among states due to economic and political differences).
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through "soft" legal decision making bodies, such as mediation and
alternative dispute resolution panels. 109
In essence, "soft law" is an important part of legal culture because it
includes both the aspirations and the operational code of foreign legal
systems of developing countries. Knowledge of the "soft law" of a
particular nation provides information as to interpretation of written law,
unstated conventions in the legal community, and trends in legislation.
"Soft law" also provides information regarding cultural differences
among legal cultures and leads to greater understanding of cultural
values.11° Additionally, "soft law" increases during times of rapid
social change. The process of globalization is a process of rapid social
change affecting and being affected by increased international economic
relations, advanced communications technology, and increased environmental interdependence. 111 Consequently, lawyers practicing transnational law involving a particular foreign nation must have knowledge of
the "soft law" of that particular nation in order to increase their
professional competency.
C.

Language and Culture

Language and culture are difficult to discuss separately. Language
symbols, grammatical structures, meanings, sounds, intonation, and
accent are culturally defined. 112 Culture and enculturation form ideas,
methods of analyses, perceptions, behaviors and beliefs. The language
selected to structure and convey these cultural phenomena reflects

109. See Christine Chinkin's remarks in Hand!, supra note 100, at 39L
110. See Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad, supra note 75, at 183-84, which underscores
the relationship between "soft law" and culture, and how important it is for lawyers to
understand the role of culture:
Culture is elusive. It is difficult for a person from one nation to fully
understand what a person from another nation views as culture and what
emphasis and value that nation places on culture, and therefore, its protection.
. . . [W]e are remiss in acting as international counsel if we fail to understand
the importance of culture in functioning abroad, and to advise our clients to
consider cultural aspects of doing business abroad. That will include a broad
range of activities .... The variations of culture make the lawyers' role more
demanding and complex.
Id.
111. See Hand!, supra note 100, at 372; see also Pierre Marie Dupuy's remarks in
Hand!, supra note 100, at 382.
112. For example, compare Chinese characters with American English characters;
compare the letter "c" in English and the letter "ch" in Spanish which does not exist in
English, although the sound is denoted through the combination of the letters "c" and
"h."
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cultural content. 113 Language is a product of culture and, simultaneously, is formative of culture. 114 Scholars have long recognized that
language, like law, does not exist in the abstract. 115 Language is
understood because of culture. 116
In 1939, Professor Leslie Spier published a seminal cross-cultural
study, comparing the relationship of "habitual thought" and "habitual
behavior" of speakers of the Hopi Indian language and speakers of the
"Standard Average European" (SAE) languages. He found that:
"[H]abitual thought" and "thought world" [mean] more than simply language,
i.e., than the linguistic patterns themselves. [They include] all the analogical and
suggestive values of the patterns (e.g., our "imaginary space" and its distant
implications), and all the give-and-take between language and culture as a
whole, wherein is a vast amount that is not linguistic but yet shows the shaping
influence of language . . . . [T]his "thought world" is the microcosm that each
man carries about within himself, by which. he measures and understands what
he can of the macrocosm. 117

In other words, the individual processes the situation around her based
on cultural information which is obtained heuristically. Thought that
precedes language is shaped by the concepts and values embodied in the
language of the individual, forming the individual's cultural perception.
Language and thought process are inextricable, us and both are
inextricable from culture. The processual relationship between language
and thought may be characterized as "linguistic thought" and "linguistic
behavior."" 9 Linguistic thought is the "hermeneutic response a person
has to the spoken or written language." 120 Professor Edward Sapir

113. Donald K. Hill, Linguistic Thought and Behavior: Sociolinguistic Considerations in Multicultural Legal Education, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 571, 576 (1991)
emphasizes the intertwined role of culture and language.
114. This does not mean that language is not subject to separate analysis.
Linguistics is a well established area of study.
115. Quinn & Holland, supra note 60, at 5 (noting that artificial intelligence
researchers who attempted translation by computers "discovered that language cannot be
understood, much less translated, without reference to a great deal of knowledge about
the world"). In other words, one of the reasons that translation by computers has failed
is that the use of language is culturally based; it is complicated and subtle.
116. See Hill, supra note 113, at 576.
117. Id. at 573 (citing JOHN B. CARROLL, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY:
SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN LEE WHORF 147 {John B. Carroll ed., 1967)).
118. Quinn & Holland, supra note 60, at 9; see also Bourdieu, supra note 67, at
809.
119. Hill, supra note 113, at 572-81.
120. Hill, supra note 113, at 572.
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explained, "[w]e see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as
we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain
choices of interpretation."121 For example, in some instances individuals will not conceptualize an idea, nor identify an event or phenomenon
because the language a speaker knows does not have an equivalent term
for the idea, event, or phenomenon existing in another language. 122
Like culture, linguistic thought is comprised of objective (social) and
subjective (interpretive) levels. 123 Objective linguistic thought deals
with pragmatic reality, whereas subjective thought deals with emotional
reality. 124 Objective linguistic thought has been characterized as
linguistic thought which permits individuals using the same language 125
to participate in the general sociolinguistic or dominant cultural
environment. Subjective linguistic thought is linguistic thought based on
the individual's social and historical experience.
1.

Inter-cultural and Inter-linguistic Communication:
Its Impact on Legal Discourse

The objective-subjective model of linguistic thought is also relevant
inter-culturally, 126 and inter-linguistically. 127 When individuals from
disparate cultures and languages interact, such as between English and
Spanish speakers, variances in understanding occur. Therefore, the
importance of linguistic thought is underscored. When objective

121. CARROLL, supra note 117, at 134.
122. Gary P. Ferraro, "The Need for Linguistic Proficiency in Global Business,"
BUSINESS HORIZONS 39, 40 (May-June 1996) (citing INSUP TAYLOR, PSYCHOLINGUISTICS: LEARNING AND USING LANGUAGE (1990), which illustrates this cognitive
phenomenon: "[T]he English language lacks a word for the aroma of roasted ground
sesame seeds, English speakers fail even to perceive the scent until it is pointed out to
them. Yet Koreans, who have a word for that particular aroma, have no difficulty
recognizing it when it fills the air.").
123. See Hill, supra note 113.
124. Id. at 580.
125. Professor Hill analyzes linguistic thought and linguistic behavior within the
phenomenon of perceptual duality [double consciousness] in the context of the Black
American experience. He maintains that issues arise regarding linguistic thought and
linguistic behavior even when parties share a common culture and common language.
He provides significant examples of linguistic thought and behavior involving perceptual
duality in regards to Black Americans and the judicial system and Black American
students in relation to cultural-legal terminology and pedagogy in law schools. He
underscores the issues perceptual duality raises for legal education in the United States,
i.e., the dissonance that exists due to the insecurity caused by the lack of correspondence
between subjective and objective thought. Id. at 581-91.
126. See Geller, supra note 66, at 207 (underscoring that language translation
problems require understanding "ever-larger contexts, ultimately entire cultures and
historical periods" in order to provide consistent interpretation).
127. See Hill, supra note 113, at 581-82.
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linguistic thought and subjective linguistic thought do not correspond, 128 communication, especially technical communication such as
legal discourse which embodies value-laden meaning, 129 often will
result in dissonance, confusion, ambiguity, and misconstruction.
The primary reason that dissonance, confusion, and ambiguity, and
thus, misunderstanding and miscommunication, occur is that language
primarily takes place on a subconscious level.
When a user/receiver linguistically uses a word or term, the signifier is suppose
[sic] to produce a mental image in his/her mind which corresponds with that
intended by its user. For the signifier to be meaningful, the word-image created
must carry the same or closely approximate signification for both parties.
When this does not occur, there is an obvious failure to communicate. If the
signifier produces an ambiguous or contradictory meaning-effect, the result is
either miscommunications, confusion, doubt, or insecurity. 130

The speaker or writer generally lacks awareness of"the values associated
with the selection of signifiers, or of the values associated with the
meaning-effect of the word or sound-images that are received." 131
Therefore, rarely does a speaker or writer "consciously weigh the value
of each signifier with respect to the influence which myth or culture has
had upon the chosen signifier in terms of cultural signification, value, or
meaning effect." 132 The matter is resolved when "the hearer ...
interpret[s] ... linguistic references from the cultural perspective of the

128. See von Mehren, supra note 37, at 248-50.
129. See Geller, supra note 66, at 210.
130. See Hill, supra note 113, at 582, 582 n.35, citing well-known linguistic
authority, F. DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 9, 13 (1966), to explain
the linguistic concepts of signifier and signification:
Our definition of the linguistic sign• poses an important question of terminology. I call the combination of a concept and a sound-image, a sign, but in
current usage the term generally designates only a sound-image, a word ....
I propose to retain the word sign [signe] to designate the whole and to replace
concept and sound-image respectively by signified [signifie] and signifier
[significant]; the last two terms have the advantage of indicating the opposition
that separates them from each other and from the whole of which they are
parts.
Id.
131. See Hill, supra note 113, at 583. See also the discussion iefra concerning the
hypothetical as to the form of the legal relationship between the U.S. American and
Mexican companies which is to be considered in the distribution of a U.S. American
product into Mexico.
132. Id.
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speaker rather than that of the hearer ...." 133 "To do otherwise ...
create[s] confusion and misunderstanding." 134

D.

A Simple Problem of Language and Culture with Significant
Legal Ramifications: The Single Word

The following example demonstrates the difficulty of communicating
the same legal concept inter-linguistically and inter-culturally via the use
of a single word. The issue arises from variation in the definition of the
term "investment" in Spanish and in English. 135 In Spanish, the term
investment translates to "inversion." The terms "investment" and
"inversion" have different Latin roots. In English, "investment," from
investire, means "to install, to surround, to clothe in a garment;" whereas
"inversion" in Spanish, from invertire, means "to change position, to
turn over or turn around." 136 This variance in meaning suggests that
the terms differ diametrically: in the United States "investment" seeks
long-term benefits, while in Mexico "inversion" seeks short-term
profit. 137 Stated another way, objective and subjective linguistic

133. Id. at 583 n.37. Professor Hill, again citing to De Saussure, states:
Language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term
results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others .... [A]ll values
are apparently governed by the same paradoxical principle. They are always
composed:
(l) of a dissimilar thing that can be exchanged for the thing of which the
value is to be determined; and
(2) of similar things that can be compared with the thing of which the
value is to be determined.
Both factors are necessary for the existence of a value. To determine what a
five-franc piece is worth one must therefore know: (l) that it can be exchanged
for a fixed quantity of a different thing, e.g., bread; and (2) that it can be
compared with a similar value of the same system, e.g., a one-franc piece, or
with coins of another system (a dollar, etc.). In the same way a word can be
exchanged for something dissimilar, an idea; besides, it can be compared with
something of the same nature, another word. Its value is therefore not fixed
so long as one simply states that it can be exchanged; for a given concept, i.e.,
that it has thus or that signification: one must also compare it with similar
values, with other words that stand in opposition to it. Its content is really
fixed only by the concurrence of everything that exists outside it. Being part
of a system, it is endowed not only with a signification but also and especially
with a value, and this is something quite different.
Id. at 583 (citing De Saussure, supra note 130, at 114-15).
134. Hill, supra note 113, at 576 (stating that this is true even if one of the two
parties speak the same language or languages).
135. See Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Access and Protection for Foreign Investment in
Mexico under Mexico's New Foreign Investment Law and the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 10 ICSID REV. FOR. INVEST. L.J. 54, 76 (1995).
136. Id. at 75-76.
137. Professor Ewell provides a series of hypotheticals to illustrate whether a
business venture, depending on the facts, might be an investment subject to NAFTA and
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thought will not correspond to the meaning of the term "investment" in
English -and Spanish. The thoughts being formed in the minds of
speakers from the United States and Mexico are based on different
cultural and linguistic backgrounds and divergent values resulting in
erroneous assumptions, 138 unless the latter are made clear at the outset
of the legal discourse. Lack of familiarity with the basic difference in
the meaning of the word, and therefore its intended use, in the contexts
of the United States Common law and Mexican Civil Law systems,
respectively, could lead to linguistic and cultural misunderstanding,
thwart foreign investment in either or both countries, and lead to
litigation due to miscommunication. 139

E.

Two Languages, Two Subcultures and a Single Word Lead to
Litigation: "What is 'chicken'"?

Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp., 140 a
well known first-year contracts case, demonstrates the problems caused
by misunderstanding and miscommunication because the parties did not
know each other's commercial subculture (custom), despite speaking
each other's languages. Frigaliment involves legal discourse concerning
the definition of an industry term, "chicken" in English, and whether or
not the U.S. American company (B.N.S.), a supplier of chicken, had a
breached a warranty under its contract with a Swiss company
(Frigaliment), a buyer of chickens, by delivering stewing chicken instead
of broilers or fryers. 141 B.N.S. agreed to deliver to Frigaliment fresh
frozen "chicken" for consumption in Europe. Both parties' representatives spoke English and German. 142 During the negotiations, B.N.S. 's
and Frigaliment's representatives had exchanged telegrams concerning
the type of chicken to be shipped. 143 Although the telegrams were
essentially in German, the English word "chicken" was used. B.N.S.,
attempting to clarify the term, specifically asked in one cable whether

subject to Mexican or U.S. law interpretation. Id.
138. See e.g., von Mehren, supra note 37, at 255-56.
139. For another analysis in support of this proposition, see the discussion infra of
Frigaliment.
140. 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 118.
143. Id.
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"chicken" in English meant the German word, "huhn," which included
both "brathuhn" (broilers) and "suppenhuhn" (stewing chicken) and was
told, "any kind of chickens." 144 The dispute as to the English meaning
of "chicken" arose because Frigaliment's representatives understood the
English word "chicken" to mean "young" chicken, i.e., broilers and
fryers. Frigaliment's representatives understood the German word
"huhn" to mean both broilers and stewing chicken. B.N.S. 's representatives, however, understood the English word "chicken" to mean "huhn."
Consequently, B.N.S. delivered, inter alia, stewing chicken to
Frigaliment in Switzerland. Upon receiving the stewing chicken,
Frigaliment protested and sued B.N.S. because it had not received broiler
chicken.
The federal district court did a painstaking analysis of trade usage in
construing the ambiguous English word "chicken." The court compared
the meaning of the term in both English and German, as understood in
the domestic and international industries. "Chicken," in English in the
United States, was broadly defined and included broilers, fryers, and
stewing chicken; whereas, the English term in Switzerland was narrowly
defined and meant only young chickens, i.e., broilers or fryers. The court
noted that Frigaliment's subjective intent was to buy young chicken,
while B.N.S. 's subjective intent was to sell stewing chicken. Thus,
although the parties' objective linguistic thoughts corresponded, neither
party 's subjective linguistic thoughts corresponded. The court looked
to various trade sources from both countries to determine an objective
definition of the term and then relied on an "objective" source, the
dictionary, to ascertain that B.N.S. 's subjective intent coincided, at least
minimally, with the dictionary meaning. The court understood B.N.S.'s
subjective linguistic thought to correspond more closely to the objective
linguistic thought of the court as supported by an objective source (the
dictionary), and thus, held in B.N.S. 's favor. 145
Frigaliment demonstrates that even though the parties to the transaction speak the same language, or languages (English and German), the
meaning of words, here "chicken," will be understood differently
depending on the individual speaker's commercial subculture. Because
of their lack of mutual cultural knowledge, the parties in the Frigaliment
case misunderstood and miscommunicated their intent which was based
on their respective cultural interpretations, affecting their rights and
obligations under the contract.

144. Id.
145. The court held that in this instance the proper construction was the broadest
definition of the term because of the price terms negotiated. Id. at 121.
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F.

A Complex Problem of Language and Culture with Significant
Legal Ramifications: An Example of Selecting the Appropriate
Contractual Device

The Frigaliment case, discussed above, presents a relatively simple
linguistic error based on a cultural misunderstanding between parties
speaking the same languages who had different cultural expectations and
which had serious legal consequences. This subsection explores a more
complex potential problem of misunderstanding and miscommunication
due to linguistic and cultural differences arising when practitioners and
parties of common and civil law systems interact. The problem was
recently demonstrated at the Fourth Annual Conference of the United
States-Mexico Law Institute where panelists from Mexico and the United
States were asked to address a hypothetical problem concerning a U.S.
American manufacturer who was distributing a product into Mexico via
an existing Mexican company. 146 It was assumed that an U.S. American attorney would be involved in some manner (if not entirely) in the
representation of the U.S. American company during negotiations. One
of the issues the panelists addressed was the form of the parties' legal
relationship and the type of written contract to be used by the parties
under Mexican civil law. 147 Two panelists, one from each side of the
border, noted the importance of the U.S. American attorney's understanding of the legal concept of "classifying" the legal relationship from
a civil law perspective, 148 and therefore, the type of contract to be
used.
In the jurisprudence of the civil law system, it is assumed that
behavior and transactions are subject to categorization. 149 Consequently, "classifications have substantive value; they are capable of creating,
extinguishing, or modifying rights and duties." 15 Classifications in

°

146. See Gordon, supra note 24 passim.
147. Gordon, supra note 24, at 72-75.
148. Id. at 72, 74.
149. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., Roman Law in Europe and
the Jus Commune: A Historical Overview with Emphasis on the New Legal Science of
the Sixteenth Century, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. I, 20-24 (1994); see also
SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 22, at 299-304.
150. See Gordon, supra note 24, at 77.
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Mexico have performative functions. 151 For example, defining a
contract in a particular manner carries a presumption that it is in fact
such a contract, although it may be established otherwise. By contrast,
in the United States, categorizations do not have performative functions.
They only have theoretical value ''useful only to the extent that they
reflect transactional reality or help to explain statutory or judicial language."152 Therefore, the designation of and the definitions constituting legal classifications recognized in Mexican law are substantively
different from classifications in the United States, serving to demonstrate
to U.S. American practitioners the "foreignness" 153 of legal reasoning
under Mexican law which is based on legal and cultural assumptions.154 In the hypothetical situation provided, at least two different
types of Mexican contracts were to be considered in selecting the
appropriate classification of the legal relationship between the companies
concerning the distribution of U.S. American goods into Mexico. The
two different types of contracts were based on existing legal classifications, contrato de mediaci6n (intermediary's contract) and contrato de
comisi6n (commission contract), each with its own tax and labor law
considerations. The specific classification of the contract would have to

151. See Bourdieu, supra note 67, at 809 (regarding the performative function of
law; see discussion infra concerning performative functions).
152. Bourdieu, supra note 67, at 809. In the United States, for example, designating
a contract to be an "agency contract" does not create an agent-principal relationship
which is then scrutinized as to whether or not it complies with the requirements of an
agency contract. The designation of the contract as an agency contract may provide
evidence as to the parties' intent to enter into an agency contract, but the result may be
a valid contract of another nature.
153. The author is presuming that a U.S. American attorney would be representing
the U.S. American company in the transaction to some significant degree, either solely
and directly, or in conjunction with Mexican counsel, such that the U.S. American
attorney would be deemed to be practicing law under the circumstances. Consequently,
the notion of the "foreignness" of the Mexican Civil legal system would be important.
154. See Gordon, supra note 24, at 73, 74, 80. One of Mexican panelists described
the concept of classification as follows:
We have behind us Justinian, the Roman law and the Napoleonic Code. That
means that, generally speaking, when we talk about a particular contract, it is
as if we are talking about a box or a particular door. If you say "contrato de
comisi6n" [commission contract] or if you say "contrato de compraventa"
[sell-purchase agreement] that means that under the civil code you go to a
building, you go up four stories to the floor called "contracts", you go down
the corridor and open the door which is called "[sell-purchase]" and there are
the rules. It is simply a different way of thinking. It's not only important that
we lawyers in the practice think that way, but the courts think that way too.
This means, for example, courts are going to apply the rules that they consider
applicable to the nature of that contract, regardless of the name of the contract.
Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
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be carefully scrutinized during negotiations, before agreeing to a certain
type of contract.
Additionally, legal language cognates would have to be used with
caution during negotiations because the different approach to legal
classification in the U.S. American common law and the Mexican civil
legal systems would not result in "word for word" translation. For
example, the contrato de comision (commission agreement) has two
different legal meanings and effects. The contrato de comision is either
an agreement concerning a commissioned act, or an agreement concerning the payment of a commission. 155 The former contract is almost
analogous to an agency agreement at common law. Through this device,
the U.S. American principal would be deemed to be doing business in
Mexico, and thus, subject to taxation in Mexico. 156 The latter type of
commission agreement is analogous to a U.S. American contract for
payment of commission.
On the other hand, there is no literal translation of contrato de
mediacion (intermediary's contract). The contrato de mediacion does
not refer to mediation or arbitration as used in the U.S. American legal
context. 157 The contract generally refers to providing an intermediary
service for a fee (not a commission). Through this intermediary service
an entity or a person introduces the product to potential buyers (i.e.,
through catalogues) with the understanding that potentially interested
buyers will contact · the seller directly without any further services
required of the "intermediary." 158 Because this contract does not
create an agency relationship, there are no tax consequences. 159
Although it is vaguely similar to a consultant's relationship, the contrato
de mediacion has no counterpart in the United States. The foregoing
contracts would establish very distinct rights and obligations of the
parties,1 60 some with analogues in the United States (such as the
contrato de comision), and some which vaguely resemble types of
155. See Gordon, supra note 24, at 72-73, and Jose Maria Abascal Zamora,
Contrato de Comisi6n, in A-CH DICCIONARIO JURIDICO MEXICANO, 526-529 (Editorial
Porrua, S.A., 7th ed. 1994), discussing "comisi6n mercantil."
156. See Gordon, supra note 24, at 73.
157. See Fernando Alejandro Vasquez Pando, Contrato de Mediaci6n in A-CH
DICCIONARIO JURIDICO MEXICANO, supra note 155, at 704-706 (for a legal definition of
"contrato de mediaci6n").
158. Id.
159. See Gordon supra note 24, at 73.
160. Id. at 73-75.
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contracts in the United States but are without legal equivalents (such as
the contrato de mediacion).
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that objective and subjective
linguistic thought will not correspond in the minds of individuals of
different cultural and linguistic backgrounds because different methods
of legal reasoning and different values underlie the different legal
systems in which they operate. Unless the parties become aware of the
differences in their linguistic and cultural assumptions, the likelihood of
misunderstandings and miscommunications in legal discourse between
parties of different legal systems, languages, and cultures is great. 161

1.

Professional Competency: Where Language, Culture and Law
Meet on a Daily Bp.sis

The legal profession and tradition is particularly language sensitive.162 Without language there would not be laws or la~ers. The
business of lawyers is to transact or litigate through words. 1 3 Competency in the profession, therefore, requires expertise in legal discourse.
Legal discourse consists of knowledge of legal terms, semantics,
grammar, and legal language's "performative function," all of which are
culturally defined.
Like all other languages, legal language is culturally bound. Yet,
unlike other languages, legal language is "performative." 164 Legal
language has an inherent and special formative attribute in that it "makes
things true simply by saying them." 165 For example, legislative
enactments create norms of individual behavior; judicial orders dictate
behavior of parties; juries determine fact from non-fact and relate facts
to law; and parties to a contract ordain rights and obligations pursuant
to written or oral agreement. Societal values and norms are expressed
through the performative function of legal language, and the meaning of
a legal statement is related to the social and cultural context in which it
is formulated. 166 Proper choice of a legal term and its appropriate use
in discourse is culturally structured. "The immediate social situation
and the broader social milieu wholly determine-and determine from
within, so to speak--the structure of an utterance. "167 Furthermore,

161. See the Frigaliment discussion supra.
162. See DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW at vii (1963).
163. See Bourdieu;supra note 67, at 809; see also Geller, supra note 66, at 210-11.
164. See Bourdieu, supra note 67; Geller, supra note 66.
165. See Bourdieu, supra note 67; Geller, supra note 66.
166. See Quinn & Holland, supra note 60; see also GEERTZ, supra note 50.
167. V. N. VOLOSINOV, Verbal Interaction, SEMIOTICS: AN INTRODUCTORY
ANTHOLOGY, 53 (R. E. Innis, ed., 1985).
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whether or not and to what extent particular aspects of legal discourse
have performative functions will vary cross-culturally. 168 Professional
competency, then, is dependent on how knowledgeable the practitioner
is of the legal discourse of the particular culture or cultures involved.
Lack of competency in legal discourse is directly related to lack of
knowledge of legal language within its cultural context, which in turn
lead to misunderstanding and miscommunication. Misunderstanding and
miscommunication involving legal discourse take place when speakers
of the same language and culture interact; 169 when speakers of the
same language and different cultures interact; 170 and, most importantly,
when speakers of different languages and different cultures interact. 171
The increased likelihood of misunderstanding and miscommunicating is
found in the latter type of legal discourse because "the structure [and
meaning] of legal discourse in different legal cultures will be, by
definition, diverse." 172 Problems regarding professional competency,
professional responsibility, and malpractice are also likely to increase in
the latter instance. 173

168. See discussion supra regarding the function of classification in civil as opposed
to common law systems.
169. See Hill, supra note 113, at 581-91.
170. See, e.g., Frigaliment discussion supra.
171. In the business world, examples abound of cultural and linguistic errors by
American firms in marketing products in other cultures and in other languages. For
example, General Motors' "Body by Fisher" appeared in Flemish as "Corpse by Fisher;"'
Pepsi-Cola's "Come Alive with Pepsi" appeared as "Pepsi brings your ancestors back
from the grave" in Chinese; and, "rendezvous lounges" in passenger aircrafts in Brazil
translated as "room[s] for making love" in Portuguese. Ferraro, supra note 122, at 39
(citing PAUL SIMON, THE TONGUE-TIED AMERICAN (New York: Continuum Press, 1980).
The slogan "it takes a tough man to make a tender chicken," appeared in Spanish as, "it
takes a virile man to make a chicken affectionate." Id. (citing Susan R. Parr,
International Education: Do not Leave Home Without It, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Nov. 17, 1992, at 19).
Such errors have resulted in millions of dollars of losses and damage to U.S. American
firms' reputations and credibility. Aware of the high cost of inter-linguistic and intercultural problems, graduate schools of business have recognized the need to educate their
students to participate in the globalization era by offering specialized courses in the
culture of other nations in their domestic language. For example, Columbia Graduate
School of Management is currently offering such courses. The potential for misunderstanding and miscommunication in the legal setting is great with the result being just as
damaging, in addition to the increased potential for malpractice liability and ethics violations. Law schools should emulate the business school model in training future
practitioners of transnational law.
172. See Saltman, supra note 54, at 117.
173. See Waxman, supra note 4.
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G.

Professional Competency and Professional Responsibility: A
Case of "Broken Spanish" and "Broken English"

A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, In re Disciplinary Action
David L. Curl, 174 illustrates the intersection between professional
competency and professional responsibility in an inter-linguistic and
inter-cultural setting. In re Curl concerned the disciplinary hearing of
an Arizona attorney for the unintentional misrepresentation of a
judgment of the Supreme Court of Sonora, Mexico (Sonoran court).
Curl relied on his client's representation as to the legal interpretation and
effect of the Mexican judgment of the Sonoran court. 175 His client,
who had been the defendant in the underlying matter, had represented to
him that the Sonoran court had entered a judgment on the merits in his
favor and that he had obtained a Mexican attorney's opinion on the
issue. Curl subsequently confirmed the interpretation and legal effect of
the judgment with another Mexican attorney. 176 However, Curl did not
speak fluent Spanish and the Mexican attorney with whom he consulted
did not speak fluent English. Curl and the Mexican attorney discussed
the legal meaning and effect of the Sonoran court's holding in "broken
Spanish" and "broken English." 177 The Sonoran court ruled for Curl's
client and awarded him costs of the trial. However, the judgment was
not a judgment on the merits; the Sonoran court also held that plaintiff's
appeal was dismissed without prejudice and plaintiff could proceed to
vindicate its rights in the appropriate manner (in Spanish, "por lo que se
dejan a salvo sus derechos para que los haga valer en la via y forma
correspondiente"). 178 Plaintiff had already brought suit successfully in
an United States district court against Curl's client. 179
On appeal, Curl represented to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that
the Sonoran court's judgment was a decision on the merits. In both
Curl's appellate brief and in his oral argument, he reiterated his
representation of the Sonoran court's judgment. Curl argued that the
judgment was subject to comity and plaintiff's suit was barred by the
doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. 180 The Ninth Circuit

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
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Court of Appeals upheld the United States district court's judgment in
favor of plaintiff. 181
The Ninth Circuit sanctioned Curl by public admonition. 182 The
court reasoned no prudent U.S. American attorney would rely on his
client's interpretation of foreign law or rely on the interpretation or legal
effect of a foreign judgment based on the opinion of an attorney of the
foreign jurisdiction when neither attorney spoke the other's language
fluently. 183 The court held that this behavior was "reckless" and Curl
had violated the standards of professional responsibility and his duty to
the court. 184
In this case, the U.S. American attorney brought the appeal because
he believed there was a final judgment in his client's favor. He did not
understand the legal meaning and effect of the Mexican judgment. He
was unfamiliar with Mexican civil law; he did not know the Spanish
legal language and he lacked linguistic and cultural competence. Had
he known Mexican legal discourse, he would not have had to rely on a
Mexican attorney's opinion as to the legal effect of the Sonoran court's
judgment. If he had knowledge of Mexican legal discourse, at a
minimum, he would have been alerted to the probable misunderstanding
and lniscommunication with Mexican counsel and would have sought
another opinion. In either case, he would have known that an appeal
would not lie on the grounds of comity, collateral estoppel, and res
judicata and would have thought twice about bringing a "baseless"
appeal.18s
Problems such as Curl's are likely to increase in inter-cultural and
inter-linguistic situations due to a lack of linguistic and cultural
knowledge. However, legal discourse issues of this type are not
insurmountable. Legal discourse can be learned. Culture is comprised
of both implicit and explicit characteristics and values. 186 The organization of such knowledge is ascertainable to a functional degree and may

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 1005.
Id. at 1007.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Bourdieu, supra note 67, at 806.
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be learned187 together with legal language. 188 The purpose is to learn
to understand from the speaker's viewpoint. 189
Proficiency in a language and culture requires awareness and training.
Law schools, therefore, should be preparing law students for a globalized
legal market by training them in the foreign law, culture, and legal
language of the country or countries in which their legal services are
most likely to be in demand. Countries in which the interests of U.S.
American clients are likely to arise and legal services are likely to be
needed, such as the United States' major trading partners, Canada,
Mexico, and Japan.
1.

NAFTA: Competency and Professional Responsibility

In order to be competitive in the NAFTA marketplace, future
practitioners must be competent and meet the standards of professional
responsibility. For situations in which Mexican law is at issue, the
attorney in the case must either become competent to deal with the
matter 190 or seek competent counsel on behalf of the client. 191 The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility require that a lawyer handle competently the client's
matter by being prepared to address every pertinent legal issue in the
case. Failure to do so is an ethical violation and a basis for malpractice
liability. Since U.S. American lawyers, with few exceptions, are not
sufficiently versed in Mexican law, at a minimum they must seek

187. But see von Mehren, supra note 37, at 255 (stating that the need to "operate
effectively in transactions involving more than one legal system requires a kind of
insight and feel that perhaps relatively few lawyers have and that probably cannot be
explicitly taught except in the sense of developing an awareness of potential difficulties"). This author is of the opinion that teaching in the domestic language of the
foreign legal system will increase awareness and proficiency of the foreign law under
study. The assumption is not being made that one will entirely understand and operate
in the foreign legal system as if one had been born, raised and educated as a local
practitioner. Instead, the goal should be to train future practitioners to achieve
proficiency to the level of competency.
188. See Geller, supra note 66, at 208, 209 (noting that since languages are
translatable, cultural obstacles are not impenetrable, even though certain variables, i.e.,
time, distance, disparities of outlook or assumptions, make the act of translation difficult)
(citing GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL: ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION 48
(2d ed. 1992)).
189. See Hill, supra note 113, at 576.
190. See supra note 29. See also In re Roel, 3 N.Y.2d 224, 144 N.E.2d 24, 165
N.Y.S.2d 31 (1957) (holding that attorneys admitted to the New York State Bar who are
retained to handle a case dealing with foreign law have a duty to the client to know the
foreign law at issue and may not claim otherwise).
191. See Goebel, supra note 3; see also Waxman, supra note 4.
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counsel who has adequate knowledge and preparation. 192 However,
transferring cases to other attorneys due to lack of competence in the
legal area is less than optimal. The better solution is to educate U.S.
American law students to be competent attorneys in the area, thus
making them competitive. 193
Lack of cultural knowledge will also limit entry into the NAFTA
market. 194 For example, cultural variances in negotiation styles can
impede expansion due to miscommunication and different cultural
expectations of appropriate behavior. In Mexico, for instance, negotiation discourse, behavior, and goals differ from U.S. American negotiation discourse, behavior, and goals. 195 Relationship and time are
treated differently in this context. 196 On a general level, Mexican
cultural discourse includes personal introduction of the parties and
personal knowledge about the parties before negotiating. Because the
individual is "perceived as the essence of his or her business," 197
inquiries into areas, such as family and personal interests, are made over
meals and other social events, with the goal of building both trust and
an ongoing relationship. 198 U.S. Americans, on the other hand,
perceive contracting as a business-to-business relationship. 199 Consequently, an U.S. American might "cold call" somebody to propose a
meeting to discuss an idea for a business venture; when the parties meet,
after a few pleasantries, they "get down to business" and follow a

192. This, however, is problematic if the U.S. American lawyer is selecting Mexican
counsel with whom she is unfamiliar and she desires to continue to act in the matter as
co-counsel. Communicating with Mexican counsel may prove troublesome if the North
American attorney does not speak Spanish and understand sufficient legal Spanish
terminology to discuss strategy and make decisions. Moreover, such circumstances
would require a contractual relationship with co-counsel from Mexico requiring
knowledge of Mexican law, legal, social and political culture and Spanish legal
terminology.
193. Currently, representatives of the NAFTA countries are discussing requirements
for Foreign Legal Consultants, as permitted by NAFTA provision.
194. See, e.g., Gordon, Hamburgers Abroad, supra note 75.
195. See generally Rona R. Mears, Contracting in Mexico: A Legal and Practical
Guide to Negotiating and Drafting, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 737 (1993). See also Arvind
V. Phatak and Mohammed M. Habib, The Dynamics of International Business
Negotiations, BUSINESS HORIZONS, May-June 1996, at 30, 34.
196. See Mears, supra note 196, at 757, 758; Phatak and Habib, supra note 196, at
34.
197. Mears, supra note 196, at 755.
198. Id. at 757-58.
199. Id. at 756, 757.
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specific set of points on an agenda.200 For U.S. Americans, "time is
money," set procedures, and punctuality (as defined by U.S. American
norms) are important values and functions in the business context.201
By contrast, Mexicans perceive time based on valued social norms
conducive to strong family and friendship ties. Time is an "endless
continuum-context[,] rather than constraint--in which we live" and in
which personal relationships develop. 202 Thus, the style of negotiations and the determination as to whether or not the negotiations were
successful is dictated by cultural expectations and interpretations
concerning the appropriate manner of conducting business.203

G.

Comparative Law and International Law: Where Law, Culture,
and Language Meet in the Law School Curriculum

Historically, U.S. American law school curricula have virtually ignored
substantive courses on the culture and legal terminology of other
nations. 204 Generally, there has been no recognition of the need to
train students in areas dealing either with laws of foreign nations or with
legal cultures and legal language of other sovereign states. Only two
substantive law areas in the U.S. law school curriculum have dealt
consistently with legal culture and legal terminology of other sovereign
nations: comparative law and international law. This section reviews the
role of these two disciplines in legal education and explores their
relationship to courses teaching foreign law, culture, and legal language.

1.

Comparative Law

Comparative law has not been considered a significant part of law
school education.205 This perception arises from the assumption that
it is unnecessary to train students in "esoteric" areas. 206 The comparative law approach consists of comparing and contrasting the domestic

200. Id.; see also Phatak and Habib, supra note 196, at 34.
201. See Mears, supra note 196, at 756, 757; see also Phatak and Habib, supra note
196, at 34.
202. See Phatak and Habib, supra note 196, at 34.
203. See Mears, supra note 196, at 758. Mears provides solutions to these
problems. Id. at 759.
204. See Waxman, supra note 4, at 391; see also Garro, supra note 10, at 271.
205. Professor Waxman indicates that a survey oflaw school curricula demonstrates
that comparative law is not a graduation requirement at most law schools; it is an
elective and is within a "required course grouping" only at six law schools throughout
the U.S. In a few instances, it is altogether omitted from the curriculum. Waxman,
supra note 4, at 391.
206. Id. (emphasizing that these subjects, like jurisprudence, are perceived to be
esoteric in nature and "shunted off to the academic sidelines").
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substantive and procedural laws of differing legal systems.207 Its
primary goal, "as a science, [is to obtain] better knowledge oflegal rules
and institutions."208 Comparative law, therefore, generally is considered to have theoretical not "practical value."209
Due to the impetus of globalization, law schools, law students, and the
practicing bar should re-examine the role of comparative law "in legal
education [as] essential to meet the needs of America and its legal
advisors in the 1990s and beyond . . . . In the twenty-first century,
attorneys will regularly address domestic and foreign legal issues,
involving diverse cultures, in differing legal contexts."210 Consequently, at least one comparativist has proposed that comparative law be
integrated into the first-year curriculum.211
The inclusion of the comparative law approach in first-year courses
would be an introduction to other legal systems.212 Students would
benefit by exposure to different legal systems; fostering an awareness of
the variety in legal systems, legal culture, and legal terminology, and
highlighting areas where some problems are likely to develop. However,
to provide more than only a cursory overview of foreign legal systems,
there would still be a need for additional specialized study in the foreign
law, culture, and legal language of a particular nation, specifically, of the
major U.S. American trading partners. A year-long foreign law course
would not purport to train students to become fully competent2 13
practitioners in transnational law. However, such a foreign law course

207. Id. at 397. But see Frankenberg, supra note 11 passim (criticizing the lack of
a common purpose and approach among comparativists as an additional reason for
marginalization of the discipline).
208. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law
(Installment I of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. l, 5 (1991).
209. Id. at 1. But see Port, supra note 33, at 643 (proposing that U.S. American
law schools teach Japanese law from a comparative law perspective, in light of U.S.
American economic interests in Japan).
210. See Waxman, supra note 4, at 391.
211. Id. (citing Robert A. Stein, The Future of Legal Education, 75 MINN. L. REV.
945, 958, 959 (1991), and Goebel, supra note 3, at 458-60).
212. Id. at 397 (opining that comparative law would "invariably provide a practical
introduction into the legitimacy of distinct legal and cultural backgrounds").
213. Few law students graduate with sufficient knowledge and skills training to be
competent attorneys from the outset. However, the role of law schools is to provide, at
a minimum, an adequate introduction to substantive law areas and to teach a method of
analysis which the lawyer in practice may apply to any area of law. Excluding an entire
area of substantive law, such as foreign law, in which a clients' needs are likely to be
greater, potentially contributes to a practitioners' incompetence.
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would serve as a significant introduction to the spe'ci:fic areas of a
particular country's legal system creating a substantive base upon which
additional professional training could be obtained. Incorporating a
comparative law approach would be a significant first, but limited, step
toward adequately training transnational lawyers. A comparative law
course could be a prerequisite to taking a foreign law course (because it
would provide a good overview upon which a foreign law course could
build). However, a comparative law course alone would not serve the
purpose of training students to be practitioners as effectively as training
them in the law, culture, and legal language of the particular foreign
jurisdiction which is likely to form part of their students' practice.

2. International Law
Both academics and practitioners regard international law, like
com~arative law, as an esoteric discipline, peripheral to legal education. 14 Academics have considered international law a '"fringe'
specialty, well meaning, even noble, but naive and largely irrelevant to
the real world. ,,,21s International law rarely is a law school curriculum
requirement and "mainstream" law journals rarely publish international
law materials.216 Additionally, despite the increase in international
treaties in the 1980s which have extended the domain of international
law to include private acts and transactions (such as wills, trusts,
decedents' estates, adoption of children, abduction of children, commercial sale of goods, electronic fund transfers, bills of exchange, and
promissory notes),217 practitioners, like academics, have been reluctant
to recognize the need for training future attorneys in international law.
Problems of interpretation and application of treaty provisions,
conflicts of law, and enforceability of judgments, historically, have
occurred in intemational law. 218 These problems have been based on

214. See Trimble, supra note 11, at 811.
215. Id. at 811 (quoting John K. Gamble, Jr. & Natalie S. Shields, International
Legal Scholarship: A Perspective on Teaching and Publishing, 39 J. LEGAL Eouc. 39,
39 (1989)) (indicating that the lack ofrelationship between law and politics espoused by
international law scholars forms the basis for the perception that international law "is
irrelevant to the real world"). Professor Trimble argues that it is essential to connect
international law with "its political base" to re-establish its credibility in academia and
the profession. Id. at 823.
216. "[A] survey showed that less than 1 percent of the articles published between
1983 and 1985 in thirty major law reviews dealt with public international law. Even in
the specialized international law journals, law faculty accounted for less than 40 percent
of the total articles published." Id. at 811.
217. Id. at 811, 812.
218. Id. at 837.
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cultural and linguistic differences. 219 For example, "German courts
[have tended] to interpret the Geneva Conventions on bills of exchange
and checks as if only domestic law were involved, without reference to
other countries' interpretation."220 Additionally, uniform laws (which
have been carefully constructed to avoid ambiguities and misunderstandings) have been differentially applied because actors from different
nations are charged with their interpretation and implementation.
Problems of interpretation and application will increase because the
nature of international law has changed substantially over the last two
decades. 221 International law no longer is concerned solely with the
regulation of public relations of sovereign nations. 222 The field of·
international law has expanded to include regulation of: ( 1) private
parties' relations and transactions with private parties from other nations;
and (2) governmental actors transacting in the private domain of
international commerce.223
Varying national traditions, cultures,
languages, values, and interests will form· the bases for interpretation and
application of law in the new treaty areas and will create pitfalls which
can be avoided224 by training students in specific foreign countries'
legal systems, cultures, and languages. Another reason to consider
offering foreign law, culture, and language courses in the curriculum is
that international law practitioners tend to limit the scope of their
219. See Trimble, supra note 11, at 836, 837.
220. Id. at 837, n.99 (citing Oral statement of Ulrich Drobnig, in INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW (UNIDROIT}, INTERNATIONAL
UNIFORM LAW IN PRACTICE 305, 306 (1988)). Trimble notes that this phenomenon of
differential interpretation and implementation has applied in a variety of uniform law
settings, e.g., the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Rules on Bills of Lading, and the
United Nations Convention on the Sale of Goods. This is likely to happen in the
interpretation of NAFTA provisions, since three countries' legal cultures, languages, and
political systems are involved. Id. at 837, 838.
221. Id. at 812.
222. See, e.g., Handl, supra note 100 (discussing the need to understand the role of
soft law in international law due to the paradigmatic shift occurring in the last two
decades). The shift that has taken place has resulted in moving away from the "classic"
international law which dealt with the "state-to-state relations [of a] limited number of
fairly homogenous states" toward complex "deepening global interdependencies in
international security, environmental and economic matters[,]" evidencing (l) communal
purposes among states; and (2) the increasing role of nonstate actors. Id. at 372.
223. Id.
224. Trimble, supra note 11, at 837 (citing Zhivko Stalev, The Uniform CMEA Law
and Its Uniform Application, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF
PRIVATE LAW (UNIDROIT), INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM LAW IN PRACTICE 231, 235-36
(1988)).
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practice to specific nations. Transnational lawyers, therefore, need in
depth knowledge in foreign law, culture, and domestic legal languages
of the particular nations that are the focus of their practice. For
example, practice in the area of NAFTA will require knowledge of the
Mexican and Canadian (inc;luding the Quebe9ois) legal systems, culture,
and language (in the case of Mexico and Quebec, Spanish and
Quebe9ois, respectively). Additionally, some areas of substantive law,
such as foreign investment, are subject directly to regulation by the
foreign nation's laws. Thus, transactional lawyers will require knowledge of the specific foreign legal system, including "soft law."225 The
law school curriculum should reflect these needs.
ill.

CONCLUSION

The legal culture and terminology of the common law system has been
assumed to be the only legal culture and terminology appropriate for
training law students. In light of globalization, failure to train students
in laws, culture, and legal language of other nations will lead to
inadequately prepared lawyers in the expanding legal market place. The
conscious knowledge of legal culture and legal language in the operation
of a legal system is paramount in understanding and applying laws
within any society. Misunderstanding and lack of awareness occur
intraculturally, when it is assumed that the same or similar assumptions
are operating in order to interpret, among other things, law, legal
strategy, policy, and negotiations. The likelihood of misunderstanding
and lack of cultural awareness will be exacerbated and will impede
lawyering when law school graduates begin practicing in greater
numbers in inter-cultural and inter-linguistic arenas. Knowledge of
foreign laws, legal cultures, and legal languages leads to an understanding and awareness which will make them more effective lawyers,
domestically and intemationally.226
U.S. American law students are more likely to practice transnational
law, requiring knowledge of the Canadian, Mexican, and Japanese legal
systems, cultures, and legal languages, during this era of increased
globalization. Canada, Mexico, and Japan are currently the United

225. See Gordon, Of Aspirations and Operations, supra note 41, at 313 (noting
specifically that practitioners should not rely unduly on international law norms because
often developing nations reject these laws since they are perceived by the developing
nations as having been imposed upon them, historically, by developed nations.
Consequently, Gordon assumes that developing nations will control foreign investment
through their respective regulatory frameworks.).
226. See Richard K. Sherwin, Lawyering Theory: An Overview, What We Talk
About When We Talk About Law, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 9, 40, 41 (1992).

678

[VOL. 34: 635, 1997]

Legal Education
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

States's major trade partners, and are likely to remain so into the twentyfirst century. Furthermore, because of NAFTA's impact, as well as
Mexico's prominent role in Latin America's markets and its influential
role in Latin America's legal systems, knowledge of Mexican law,
culture, and the Spanish legal language, in particular, will provide the
greatest access to transnational markets in the Northern and Southern
American hemispheres.
Law schools have a duty to prepare students to be effective, competitive, and ethical practitioners. By not preparing students to specialize in
foreign law areas during this era of globalization, law schools will be
failing in the performance of this duty. Legal education, therefore,
should include, at a minimum, courses on the law, culture, and language
of Canada, Mexico, and Japan. Furthermore, if only one area of foreign
law is to be selected, then legal educators should choose to incorporate
courses in Mexican law, culture, and the Spanish legal language for the
reasons discussed above.
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